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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an analysis of liquidity trends in The Bahamas over the 2001-June 2012 period. The study finds 
that the significant build-up in domestic liquidity observed over the last four years, also occurred in a number of 
countries, both developed and developing, and reflected several economic factors. Specific to The Bahamas, the 
accumulation in liquidity was driven by a slowdown in credit demand and the adoption of more cautious approaches 
to lending by the banks, due to heightened loan delinquencies. In addition, the contraction in output and the 
expansion in Government borrowing—particularly from external sources—have all played a major role in the 
significant augmentation in both excess reserves and excess liquid assets in the domestic banking system. The 
paper showed that the build-up in liquidity is likely to persist in the near-term and conditions should moderate 
gradually, as the economy recovers. Moreover, the Central Bank’s use of securities such as Treasury Bills may be 
effective in producing changes in liquidity over the short-term. 
                                                          
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent The Central Bank of 
The Bahamas. This paper should be considered a work in progress and as such the authors would welcome any 
comments on the written text.
1SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
In 2008, against the backdrop of mortgage market collapse, liquidity shortages and financial market 
upheaval, a global recession ensued and shifted the landscape of regulatory and monetary policy 
framework. World GDP growth decelerated from 5.4% (2007) to 2.8% (2008) and by end–2009 the world 
economy had contracted by 0.6%. In the United States, The Bahamas’ largest trading partner, real GDP fell 
by 3.6% in 2009 and employment conditions deteriorated, as the country’s jobless rate climbed from 4.6% 
in 2007 to 9.3% by the close of 2009.  
Given the strong inter-linkages between the Bahamian and United States economies, particularly 
as it relates to tourism and foreign investment, the global recession also led to a downturn in domestic 
economic activity. Specifically, in 2008, real GDP contracted by 2.3%, and fell by a further 4.9% in the 
following year, as tourism output and private sector construction activity slowed substantially. In particular, 
air arrivals fell by 6.4% in 2008, and contracted further by 10.1% in 2009, before recovering to growth of 
3.4% in 2010. Similarly, construction sector indicators also deteriorated over the period, as foreign 
investment activity stagnated and on the domestic side, the number of permits issued and the value of 
construction starts plunged by 24.1% and 9.7%, respectively in 2009. Given the downturn in these key 
industries, the unemployment rate rose from 8.7% in 2008 to 14.2% by the end of 2009 and remained 
elevated at 14.7% in May-2012. In this environment, Government introduced a series of measures aimed at 
providing support for the economy. However, with the negative effect of the recession on its revenue and 
the increase in expenditure to support a series of new programmes, the deficit widened considerably from 
approximately 1.8% of GDP in FY07/08 to 4.7% of GDP by FY10/11, while the corresponding debt to GDP 
ratio advanced to 55.9% at end-2011 from 36.9% at end-2007. The adverse effects of the recession on the 
business sector and the labour market resulted in a surge in banking sector arrears, which grew from 
12.4% of total loans in 2008 to 19.3% in 2011, while growth in private sector credit slowed from 5.3% in 
2008 to a marginal 0.9% in the following year, and averaged 0.4% between 2010 and 2011, due in large 
measure to banks’ adoption of conservative lending policies and reduced consumer demand.
Benefitting from the slowdown in credit growth, heightened Government borrowing and several 
significant one-off foreign currency transactions, liquidity in the banking system rose substantially. As 
evidence, net free cash reserves more than doubled to $445.5 million at end-June 2012 when compared to 
$164.8 million at end-2008, and represented 7.2% of Bahamian dollar deposit liabilities, vis-à-vis 2.9% in 
2008. Similarly, surplus liquid assets, a broader measure of liquidity, advanced to $982.3 million by the end 
2of the first half of 2012, almost four times higher than 2008’s level of $258.1 million, exceeding the statutory 
minimum by 99.1% by end-June, 2012, compared to 28.3% in 2008.
The build-up in liquidity witnessed since 2008 also characterized several other economies, in 
response to a number of external and domestic factors. Typically, when the crisis began to intensify in 
2009, central banks worldwide initiated a number of measures to support economic activity and boost credit 
growth. For instance, in the United States, the Federal Reserve implemented a series of “quantitative 
easing” measures to spur economic activity, which contributed to a surge in liquidity. Further, it is important 
to note that an augmentation in liquidity can be the result of market forces, as was the case in countries 
such as Japan, India and Turkey, which were forced to employ monetary policy tools to deal with excess 
liquidity. Additionally, in the Caribbean, countries such as: Trinidad & Tobago, Jamaica and Barbados 
reported robust liquidity expansion arising from the economic downturn
Although elevated liquidity is beneficial, as banks have sufficient funds on hand to meet customer 
demands when they arise, the build-up in liquidity could also pose potential risks and challenges in terms of 
the implications for the domestic economy and indeed the Central Bank’s monetary policy, both in the short 
and long term. This paper therefore seeks to examine the factors which affect liquidity in the banking 
system and based on the results, prescribe potential monetary policy options which the Central Bank can 
pursue to address the issues raised. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 
examines pertinent literature relating to liquidity in the banking system, while section 3 highlights existing 
best regulatory practices in liquidity management and section 4 analyses trends in excess reserves and 
excess liquid assets in The Bahamas over the period 2001 to 2011. Section 5 presents the results of an 
empirical analysis of both excess reserves and excess liquid assets. The main findings and policy 
recommendations are summarized in section 6.
SECTION 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
A number of authors have explored the subject of excess liquidity in the banking system and its 
impact on Central Banks’ ability to effectively influence monetary policy. In recent years, particularly since 
the onset of the global economic crisis, liquidity build-up has gained more prominence in economic 
literature.    
3In a study conducted by Caprio and Honohan (1991), the problems of excess banking system 
liquidity and the appropriateness of Governments’ responses to situations of excess liquidity with respect to 
both industrialized countries and developing countries were examined.  The authors identified excess 
liquidity as either the share of liquid assets in bank portfolios (due to a reduction in lending), or the holdings 
of money by the nonbank public.  Further, the study recognized the causes of excess liquidity as either 
involuntary rationing or voluntary behaviour.  With respect to industrialized economies, it was noted that 
excess liquidity—as evidenced by decreased treasury yields and increased spreads between low-risk and 
high-risk assets—was tantamount to contractionary monetary policy.  Consequently, monetary expansion 
would facilitate aggregate demand for credit where excess liquidity exists.  For developing countries, 
excess liquidity was attributed to administrative limits on expanding credit and constrictive monetary policy.  
In particular, cash balances at banks in centrally planned economies primarily represent household 
savings, due to a lack of alternative savings media.  The researchers concluded that excess liquidity 
conditions do not call for a tightening of monetary policy, but an examination of the underlying causes 
and/or information deficiencies, and the adoption of more appropriate actions, including structural reforms.
Further, Khemraj (2009) hypothesized that before banks in less developed countries (LDCs) can 
make a loan, they must require a minimum rate of interest that compensates for risks, marginal transaction 
costs and the rate of return on “safe foreign” assets. He proposed that banks consequently accumulate 
excess liquidity in cases where the marginal borrower is unwilling to pay the minimum rate.  In this study, 
excess liquidity was identified as the difference between banks’ total liquidity and total required liquidity.  
For the study, nine developing countries, known for persistent excess liquidity conditions, including The 
Bahamas, were analyzed.  Locally weighted polynomial regressions were conducted to extract liquidity 
preference curves for each country.  The main finding was that the fitted liquidity curves tended to become 
flat and the flatness occurred at a very high rate of interest, thus indicating that banks viewed loans and 
excess liquidity as perfect substitutes at high interest rates, which implied that banks would not lend to the 
marginal borrower if they were unwilling to pay the rate of interest.  From the findings, Khemraj also 
deduced that the banking sector in LDCs is oligopolistic and not competitive.  Further, two of the key 
implications of the study are that comparatively high interest rates will occur if the loan market in LDCs is 
liberalized and high loan rates would be constrictive to economic development and employment creation in 
economies where banks provide most business financing.
4Specific to the Caribbean, Maynard and Moore (2006) conducted an empirical assessment of 
excess reserve dynamics using an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model. The authors found that 
liquidity growth is a function of shocks to the currency-to-deposit ratio—a measure of consumers’
transactions—the business cycle, the interest rate on Treasury bills and the banking sector’s financing to 
the Government, as proxied by the net domestic assets. The study noted a significant rise in banks’ excess 
liquidity during the 2001 recessionary period, which Maynard and Moore attributed to monetary expansion,
coupled with a moderation in credit. Further, the authors determined that for the period under review, the 
accumulation in reserves was largely occasioned by demand-side factors.
The research paper by Anderson-Reid (2011), using a cointegration-ARDL model, noted similar 
results for the determinants of excess liquidity in the commercial banking system of Jamaica in both the 
long and short-term. In addition to achieving significant results for the variation in the currency-to-deposit 
ratio, income deviation from trend, income volatility and the interest rate of the Bank of Jamaica’s 180-day 
Treasury bill, the author also found strong results for the relationship between liquidity and the Central 
Government’s deficit. Anderson-Reid further observed that despite an increase in the Central Bank’s 
reserve requirement, in an effort to combat the effects of the global financial crisis, commercial banks 
averaged reserves of $57.9 million over a 12-year period ending December 2010, some $19.2 million 
above the requirement.
Aikaeli (2006) utilized an autoregressive distributed lag model of banks’ demand for excess 
reserves to ascertain the factors that bring about excess liquidity in commercial banks in Tanzania. The 
author concluded that excess liquidity positively correlated to an elevation in the cost of funds, credit risks, 
the volatility of deposit holders’ cash preference, the bank borrowing rate and variations in loan returns or 
credit risk in both the short-term and over the long-term. In addition, the author found that in the short-run, 
the possibility of banks incurring illiquidity costs had a positive influence on excess liquidity, prompting them 
to accumulate more reserves.
Given the importance of bank liquidity in providing a buffer during periods of economic crisis, 
Moore (2007) conducted an assessment of the performance of a number of forecasting models—
behavioral, linear time series and non-linear time series—to determine how well they capture the dynamics 
of liquidity in times of crises for sixteen Latin American and Caribbean countries. The author concluded that 
the behavioral model was best at forecasting liquidity trends for several of the countries under review in 
5both the long and short-term.  Further, Moore found that the non-liner model outperformed the others, on 
average, over very short time periods, thus concluding that a combination of models may be useful in 
predicting liquidity dynamics.
There were a number of studies pertaining to the implications of the persistent build-up in bank 
liquidity. In the research by Maynard and Moore (2006), it was noted that, in periods of high levels of 
liquidity the fiscal authorities were concerned that banks will utilize excess reserves to engage in ‘growth-
enhancing’ opportunities. The authors determined that in Barbados, excess reserves generally have an 
inverse relationship to the business cycle, which led them to conclude that commercial banks have a 
propensity to hold more excess reserves during recessionary periods, which can have the adverse impact 
of extending a recession. Anderson-Reid (2011) in her analysis of the Jamaican banking system, 
suggested that excess liquidity poses challenges to the effective implementation of Central Bank policy, as 
it enables banks to offer additional credit to customers, despite a very tight monetary policy position by the 
Central Bank. Similar sentiments were expressed by Ganley (2004) in his study, which found that a 
significant build-up in liquidity could lead to an expansion in domestic consumption activity and 
consequently higher inflation. Finally, Agenor et.al (2004) indicated that liquidity build-up can possibly 
undermine monetary policy’s ability to sway the rate of inflation, as well as economic output.
SECTION 3: LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT: EXISTING BEST REGULATORY PRACTICES IN THE 
CARIBBEAN
In the Caribbean, foreign reserve management is a critical element of any strategy of economic 
development.  According to Blackman (1981), the issue of reserve management for economic development 
hinges on the structural dependence of most developing countries on foreign trade, the wild fluctuations in 
the export earnings of these countries, along with the steady demand for imported necessities, the 
technological and financial dependence on the industrial economies and the need to allocate scarce foreign 
exchange resources from low priority uses to strategic development activities.
Moreover, a number of objectives have been cited for reserve management.  One major objective 
encompasses the holding of liquid assets to cover both seasonal and cyclical variations in foreign 
exchange inflows.  Central Banks must maintain considerable sums of foreign exchange in the form of 
liquid assets, owing to the seasonality and lumpiness of receipts from sale of primary commodities which 
6regional economies export.  In so doing, the Central Bank ensures the reliable availability of foreign 
exchange to meet essential import needs.
In the region, liquidity management policies are similar, in that, Central Banks utilize both direct 
and indirect (market based) monetary policy instruments in an effort to effectively and efficiently manage 
liquidity levels (see Appendix Table 1). Specifically, in The Bahamas, a small open economy, with a fixed 
exchange rate regime, the Central Bank of the Bahamas uses five primary monetary policy instruments in 
order to sustain the fixed parity of the Bahamian dollar, as well as to maintain stable credit and economic 
conditions within the country. These instruments include the statutory reserve requirement ratio, the Bank 
discount rate, selective credit controls, open market operations and moral suasion.  Similarly, for Barbados, 
which also has a fixed exchange rate regime, the management of the foreign reserves is concentrated on 
maintaining an adequate cushion of reserves in order to resist pressure to adjust the parity of the Barbados 
dollar.  Therefore, in the effective management of liquidity, the Central Bank of Barbados has traditionally 
relied on statutory reserve requirements, the discount rate and moral suasion. For the Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank (ECCB), the used of monetary policy instruments is limited, with its main objective being to 
safeguard the value of the fixed exchange rate against external shocks. Consequently, the ECCB manages 
liquidity chiefly through reserve requirements and to a lesser extent through standing facilities.
For Jamaica, the management of liquidity is through two main operational tools, that of open 
market operations and the required reserves. However, given that Jamaica has a flexible exchange rate 
regime, another instrument used by Bank of Jamaica to manage liquidity is intervention in the foreign 
exchange market, that is, the direct purchases and sales of foreign currency. Like its Jamaican counterpart, 
the Central Bank of Trinidad & Tobago, which manages a floating exchange rate system, utilizes statutory 
reserve requirements, open market operations and policy interest rates, namely the repurchase rate, in its 
management of liquidity. In mid-2002 the Central Bank of Trinidad & Tobago introduced the use of the 
Repurchase (Repo) rate, which refers to the rate that the Central Bank charges commercial banks for 
collateralized overnight financing and is the Central Bank’s chief policy interest rate used to influence 
commercial banks’ interest rates. Another instrument used by the Central Bank in liquidity management is 
the Special Liquidity Facility. With regard to this facility, the Central Bank may request from time to time, 
that commercial banks deposit some proportion of their prescribed liabilities in an interest-bearing facility at 
the Central Bank for an agreed time-frame, in addition to maintaining the primary and secondary reserves 
requirement.
7Important to note is that, countries in the Caribbean have a long history of using the statutory 
reserve requirement ratio as a liquidity management tool. The required ratios are stipulated in all of the 
Central Bank Acts, along with the respective fines that are imposed on commercial banks if they fail to meet 
the outlined requirement (see Appendix Table 2 & Figure 1). For instance, the Central Bank of the 
Bahamas Act mandates that the statutory reserve level be stationed at 5.0%. The statutory reserve 
requirements of The Bahamas have remained unchanged since its implementation in 1974, despite the fact 
that the Bank does have the ability to raise the ratio to a high of 20.0%. In relation to liquidity requirements,
the following measures are in place: “the minimum required liquid assets represent 20% of bank demand 
deposits, 15% of savings and fixed deposits, and 15% of borrowings due to/from the Central Bank” (CBOB, 
2012).  According to the Central Bank Act, the penalty for not meeting the specified reserve and liquidity 
requirements include the application of a fine that does not exceed twice the annual discount rate for 
everyday that a deficit occurs.
In Jamaica, the Bank Act stipulates that banks must maintain a cash reserve of no less than 5.0% 
of their total liabilities. In addition to this, banks in Jamaica must ensure that their liquid assets on hand are 
no less than 15% of their prescribed liabilities. The penalty for non-compliance is a fine of one hundred-
and-fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) initially, and five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each additional day that 
the offence continues (Bank of Jamaica, 2010).
For the ECCB, the Bank Agreement Act states that, “with approval of the Council the Bank may, 
from time to time prescribe the maintenance of required reserves, including marginal required reserves, 
against deposits and other similar liabilities specified for this purpose. Such reserves shall be maintained 
either by way of cash holdings with each financial institution or by way of deposits with the Bank.” Since 
1994, all commercial banks were required to maintain reserves of 6% on average weekly deposits. This 
does not mean that the reserve amount will be the same for all banks. However, it does indicate that 
because the requirement is based on all deposits at a given time, the amount held from bank to bank will 
differ. Any financial institution that fails to maintain the required reserves which will be charged at an annual 
rate not exceeding five percentage points above the highest rate fixed by the Bank for any operations on 
the amount of the deficiency for so long as the deficiency persist.
Trinidad & Tobago also manipulates the reserve requirement ratio. This reserve requirement ratio 
is currently set at 17.0% of total prescribed liabilities, an increased from 2007’s ratio of 11.0%. In addition,
8the bank also chooses from time to time to employ the use of secondary reserves, which currently stand at 
2.0% of total liabilities. In the event that an institution fails to comply with the above specified rules, “the 
Central Bank shall notify such licensed domestic institution of the deficiency, and the institution shall pay to 
the Central Bank interest on the amount of the deficiency at such rate, not in excess of one-tenth of one per 
cent per day, as the Central Bank may set by notice published in the Gazette and in at least two daily 
newspapers published and circulated in Trinidad and Tobago”. Note that, with the current penalty 
measures, Trinidad & Tobago currently has the most lenient penalty structure in place when compared to 
that of their regional counterparts.
With reserve requirements of 25.0%, Barbados has the highest ratio in the region (see Appendix 
Figure 1). The reserve fund is calculated from net profits obtained each year by each banking institution 
and represents no less than 25.0% of total profits per annum. This rate has remained constant since the 
mid-1990s. Based on Section 33 of the Central Bank Act, the penalty for not meeting the outlined 
requirements entails: “an annual rate charge that does not exceed twice the rate fixed at the time of such 
failure” to meet the requirements outlined in Section 33 of their Bank Act (Central Bank of Barbados, 2011).
SECTION 4: ANALYSIS OF BANK LIQUIDITY IN THE BAHAMAS OVER THE PERIOD 2001-2011  
Liquidity in The Bahamas is defined as a bank’s ability to fund increases in assets or meet 
collateral obligations at a reasonable cost as they fall due without incurring unacceptable losses2.  For 
banks in the domestic banking system, the narrowest measure of liquidity is net free cash reserves which 
are primarily the cash holdings of banks, either held in till cash or at the Central Bank.  From these cash 
holdings, banks are legally required to maintain a portion called “statutory reserves” against their Bahamian 
dollar deposit liabilities.  The broader measure of liquidity is liquid assets, which includes notes and coins 
held in till cash or at the Central Bank, Government securities, net interbank demand/call deposits and 
other specified assets, such as public financial institutions bonds3.  All banks are required to maintain an 
average ratio of liquid assets called “minimum required liquid assets” in relation to their Bahamian dollar 
deposit liabilities.  
                                                          
2 See Banks and Trust Companies (Liquidity Risk Management) Regulations, 2012, section 2(1). 
3 See Central Bank’s Operating Circular LR 8/796 July, 16th 1996. 
9Figure 2 provides a breakdown of the three distinct periods, where liquidity was affected by several 
key factors.  Over the years of 2001-20044, economic activity in The Bahamas slowed and the Central 
Bank implemented a credit ceiling to provide support for the country’s external reserves. With a restrictive 
credit policy in place, lending growth moderated from 9.2% in 2001 to 2.1% in 20035. In addition, 
Government issued a combined $492.3 million in internal debt between 2002 and 2003. As a consequence 
of these measures, bank liquidity expanded, as net free cash reserves advanced from $56.5 million at end-
2001, representing 1.6% of deposit liabilities, to $271.6 million or 6.5% of deposit liabilities at the close of 
2004. Further, with the capital account restrictions in place regarding their overseas investments, banks 
increased their holdings of Government securities, including Registered Stock. Resultantly, the surplus 
liquid assets, increased from $67.4 million at end-2001 to $232.5 million at end-2004, to account for 34.3% 
of the statutory minimum, versus 11.8% in the prior period.  
Following the removal of the credit freeze in August 2004, there was a rapid drawdown in liquidity, 
in the subsequent years, as banks attempted to meet the pent-up demand for credit.  Credit growth surged 
to 12.7% in 2005, and advanced by an additional 14.4% and 9.5% in 2006 and 2007, respectively, as the 
economy grew by an average of 2.5% over the three year period, buoyed by a combined $1,270.0 million in 
foreign tourism-related investments and average growth of 4.8% per year in tourist expenditure. 
Consequently, net free cash reserves fell by over half, from $271.6 million at end-2004 to $190.1 million at 
end-2007, to represent 3.6% of deposit liabilities.  Similarly, banks’ surplus liquid assets plunged from 
$232.5 million at end-2004 to a mere $151.9 million at end-2007, which was 17.7% above the statutory 
minimum.
The onset of the global economic and financial crisis, which directly affected the domestic economy 
in 2008, led to a broad-based, robust build-up in liquidity, reflecting increased Government borrowing to 
fund its deteriorating deficit, as well as one-off foreign currency inflows, the largest of which related to the 
Government’s $300 million external bond issue and the receipt of approximately $210.0 million in foreign 
currency proceeds from the sale of its 51% interest in the Bahamas Telecommunications Company (BTC) 
in April 2011, the majority of which were utilized to reduce local debt obligations. This four year period 
(2008-2011) was also characterized by anemic credit growth, which averaged 1.7% and the adoption of 
conservative lending practices by the banking system, due to the surge in arrears and non-performing 
loans as a percentage of total loans, from 9.7% and 4.5% at end-2007, to 19.3% and 13.0% at end-2011,
                                                          
4The Bank’s credit freeze was in place from September 2001 to August 2004
5 Credit growth increased to 7.4% in 2004, due to the lifting of the credit freeze in August of that year.  
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respectively. Hence, banks’ excess reserves more than doubled over the four year period and stood at 
$370.6 million or 6.2% of deposit liabilities at end-2011, while surplus liquid assets ballooned by almost six-
fold to $896.4 million, which was 92.5% in excess of the statutory minimum.
SECTION 5: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LIQUIDITY IN THE BAHAMAS
In order to investigate the determinants of excess reserves (ER_RES) and excess liquid assets
(ELA) in the banking system, an analysis was conducted of several models proposed by studies conducted 
for the Caribbean. This review included the paper produced by Maynard and Moore, which posited that 
excess reserves in Barbados—a country similar to The Bahamas due to its fixed exchange rate regime and 
capital controls—were affected by customer characteristics, the macroeconomic environment and the 
Government’s fiscal strategies. The authors utilized an ARDL model and noted that excess reserves were 
positively affected by the level of excess reserves in the prior period, and negatively impacted by the level 
of required reserves (as a ratio to domestic assets), the ratio of income to trend income, the coefficient of 
variation of the income to trend income, the Treasury bill rate and the level of net domestic assets in the 
banking system, which they utilized as a proxy for Government financing. Similarly, Anderson-Reid
employed a cointegrating ARDL model to explore determinants of excess reserves in Jamaica, and noted 
that there was a long-run positive relationship between excess reserves, the output gap6, Government’s 
fiscal deficit and the level of required reserves, while the coefficients on the cash to deposit ratio and the 
volatility of income ratio were negative.        
Based on the findings of the previous authors, two models of excess liquidity in the Bahamian 
banking system were investigated using the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) methodology over the period 
2001 Q1 to 2011 Q4. Although this technique differed from the two previous studies, it is similar to the 
ARDL model because the VAR methodology utilises lags of both the dependent and explanatory variables 
in the short-run models and allows for the investigation of short-run dynamics such as impulse response 
functions. The variables chosen, including several utilized in the two aforementioned Caribbean studies, 
sought to capture the impact of the macroeconomic environment, Government’s financing decisions and 
the commercial banks’ preferences on liquidity in the banking system. The quarterly real GDP series used 
in both models was obtained from the study by Jordan and Tucker (2012), which employed the Chow-Lin 
procedure to disaggregate the annual series into quarterly values. In addition, external reserves were 
                                                          
6 i.e. the ratio of income to trend income
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included in both initial models, to capture the potential impact of significant one-time transactions on 
liquidity in the banking system, while a Dummy variable was added to assess the effect of the imposition of 
a credit ceiling between September 2001 and August 2004 on liquidity. Table 3 (Appendix) shows all of the 
variables included in the model, along with their expected signs. Logs of all of the variables with the 
exception of the Treasury bill rate and the credit ceiling were utilized in the model.  
Given the potential problem of estimating a large number of regressors within the VAR framework, 
which would significantly limit the number of lags in the model given the short data series, it was first 
necessary to eliminate insignificant regressors in both the ER_RES and ELA models. This was conducted 
using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) framework, whereby explanatory variables which were insignificant 
based on their associated p-values, were deleted from the model and the equation re-estimated until only 
significant variables remained. Table 4 shows the significant regressors for the two models along with their 
respective p-values. 
The results indicate that excess reserves (Model 1) are positively affected by the net domestic 
assets (NDA) of the banking system which implies that, ceteris paribus, as the Government’s deficits are 
financed by money creation or overseas borrowing, this raises the level of banks’ excess reserves. In 
addition, the negative coefficient for private sector credit (PCREDIT) indicates that as banks utilize their 
resources to support lending to their clients, it drains liquidity from the banking system. Meanwhile, the 
negative relationship with the Treasury bill rate (T_BILL) shows the potential trade-off between banks 
decisions to hold either unremunerated reserves at the Central Bank, or short-term securities. Given that 
the variables are estimated in log form, increases in NDA appear to have the most significant effect on 
excess reserves, as a 1.0% increase in this variable tends to raise the level of excess reserves by 7.9%,
ceteris paribus, while a 1.0% advance in private sector credit leads to a 4.7% contraction in excess 
reserves. Changes in T_BILL had the smallest impact of less than 0.5%.  In addition, as expected, the 
period when the Central Bank imposed a CEILING which restricted banks “to provide new credit only to the 
extent of resources provided from ongoing repayments” was associated with a build-up in excess reserves 
in the banking system. 
With regards to the excess liquid assets regression (Model 2), the NDA and T_BILL and CEILING 
variables were also significant; as well as RGDP; however PCREDIT was not significant in the model. All of 
12
the explanatory variables have the expected signs and both models appear to be very good fits for the 
data, as indicated by the R-squared values of 0.83 for excess reserves and 0.79 for excess liquid assts. 
The models were then tested for the presence of a long-run cointegrating relationship using the 
Johansen and Julius technique7. Both models were cointegrated as given by the Akaike Information 
Criterion or AIC statistic and had valid error correction models, which showed that a long-run relationship 
existed among the variables in the system8. 
The short run dynamics of both models were then investigated using Generalized Impulse 
Response functions. As postulated by Pesaran and Shin (1998), the advantage of Generalized Impulse 
Response functions lays in the fact that they are insensitive to the ordering of the variables in the models 
and hence the time profile of the responses remains unchanged regardless of the ordering of the 
variables9. Figure 3 (Appendix), shows that a one standard deviation positive shock to LNDA results in a 
positive responses for ER_RES, which builds-up over the first year and reaches a maximum  0.23% by the 
end of the seventh quarter. Thereafter the aggregate effect diminishes but still remains positive over the 
three year (12 quarter) period. A one standard deviation shock to PCREDIT produces a weaker positive 
response to ER_RES, which reaches a peak of 0.21% by the end of the fifth quarter; however, the 
accumulated responses diminish over the remaining periods and turn negative by the end of the of the
twelfth quarter—the inverse occurs for the T_BILL variable, although this represents the strongest absolute 
response of the three shocks. 
In contrast to LER_RES model, a one standard deviation shock to LNDA (Figure 4) produces a 
negative response to ELA which reaches its lowest level of -0.4% by the end of the eighth quarter, and then 
tapers to under -0.1% by the end of the twelfth quarter. A shock to T_BILL produces a negative response 
profile for LELA similar to model 1, which reached an aggregate low of 0.43% by the sixth quarter and then 
rapidly diminishes until it turns slightly positive by the end of the review period. A one standard deviation 
innovation to LRGDP causes a positive response to LELA, with the accumulated responses reaching a 
                                                          
7 For the purpose of the VAR model, which required that all of the explanatory variables be integrated of the same order, the 
dummy variable CEILING was excluded from the two models. All of the other variables were integrated of order I(1).  
8 The results for both models, which are available from the authors, showed that there were three co-integrating equations. The 
ER_RES error correction term was valid in model 1; however, in model 2 only the error correction term for the T_BILL variable 
was significant at the 5% level. 
9 This is in contrast to the orthogonalised impulse response functions, which are sensitive to the ordering of the variables in the 
model. 
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maximum of 0.46% by the end of the sixth quarter, but then rapidly declines until it turns marginally 
negative by the end of the time horizon. 
Overall, the results for models 1 & 2 show that the explanatory variables have significant effects on 
both LER_RES and LELA; however, the aggregate effects are relatively short-lived and reduce in their 
intensity over time. In addition, although the coefficient of the T_BILL variable is relatively small in the long-
run, its effects on liquidity in the short-run are significant, implying that the use of Treasury Bills may be 
effective in increasing and reducing liquidity in the banking system over a short time period.   
SECTION 6: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This study has sought to analyse trends in liquidity over the period 2001 to 2012, with emphasis on 
the last four years, when liquidity has surged to record levels. The analysis showed that the patterns 
witnessed in The Bahamas are similar to those experienced in other Caribbean countries and in the context 
of the local economy, the increase in liquidity is due to a number of economic factor including the slowdown
in private sector credit growth, given the high level of delinquencies in the banking system and the adoption 
of more cautious approaches by banks. In addition, the decline and subsequent slow growth in economic 
output and rise in Government borrowings have all played a role in leading to the rapid accumulation of 
excess reserves and excess liquid assets in the banking system. 
From a monetary policy perspective, this situation is unlikely to reverse in the near-term, given the 
challenges faced by customers in servicing existing loans and the weak level of consumer demand. 
Further, potential foreign currency inflows from a few large-scale foreign investment projects and tourism 
earnings, should provide additional support for bank liquidity. In addition, there are limited avenues for 
banks to invest in foreign assets, given the Exchange Control restrictions10, which should also result in 
these institutions continuing to hold significant levels of liquidity.
The study also showed that the over the medium to long-term, as economic growth accelerates 
and employment conditions improve, there may be opportunities for the Central Bank to utilize indirect 
instruments of monetary policy to impact banking sector liquidity. 
                                                          
10 Commercial banks in The Bahamas are required to maintain an open B$ position of no more than $5.0 million, in accordance 
with Exchange Control Restrictions. 
APPENDIX
Table 1: MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Bank Name Statutory 
Reserve 
Requirements 
Interest Rate 
Controls
Credit 
Controls
Moral 
Suasion 
Open Market 
Operations
Repurchase 
Rate 
Intervention in 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Market
Standing 
Liquidity 
Facility
Central Bank
of the 
Bahamas
√ √ √ √ √
Central Bank
of
Barbados
√ √ √
Eastern 
Caribbean 
Central Bank
√ √
Bank of 
Jamaica √ √ √
Central Bank
of Trinidad & 
Tobago
√ √ √ √
Source: Central Banks websites
Table 2: Reserve Requirements and Penalties
Country Reserve Requirement Penalty
Central Bank of Jamaica Minimum Reserve Requirement:  5.0% or 
more
Liquid assets on Hand: 15% or more
Fine of 150,000 and $5,000 
for each additional day in 
breach.
Central Bank of The Bahamas Minimum Reserve Requirement:  5.0% 
Minimum required liquid assets: 
    20% of bank demand deposits
    15% of savings and fixed deposits
    15% of borrowings due to/from 
Fine a maximum of twice 
the annual discount rate for 
everyday that a deficit 
occurs.
Bank of Barbados Minimum Reserve: 25% of total profits per 
annum. 
Fine an annual rate 
charge, not exceeding twice 
the rate fixed at the time of 
such failure.
Central Bank of Trinidad and 
Tobago`
•Minimum Reserve 17.0% of total 
prescribed liabilities
•Secondary Reserves:2.0% of total liabilities
Fine: interest on the 
deficiency 1/10% per day.
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Minimum Reserve Requirement: 6.0% Fine an annual rate not 
exceeding five percentage 
points above the highest 
discount/rediscount rate 
fixed by the 
Bank for as long as the 
deficiency continues.
Source: The Individual Central Banks Acts
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TABLE 3: VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSIONS AND EXPECTED SIGNS
Variable LER_RES LELA
Net Domestic Assets LNDA + +
Real GDP LRGDP - -
Real GDP/Trend GDP1 LRGDPH - -
Private Sector Credit LPCREDIT - -
External Reserves LRES + +
Treasury Bill Rate T_BILL - -
Credit Ceiling CEILING + +
Source: The Central Bank of the Bahamas and the Department of Statistics. 
1Trend real GDP obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter
TABLE 4: DETERMINANTS OF EXCESS RESERVES AND EXCESS LIQUID ASSETS
LER_RES LELA
LNDA 7.919403
(0.0004)*
5.011077
(0.0000)*
LRGDP — -3.871010
(0.0468)*
LPCREDIT -4.675056
(0.0232)* —
T_BILL -0.223796
(0.0000)*
-0.359196
(0.0000)*
CEILING 0.354178
(0.0051) *
0.727321
(0.0006) *
C -21.99819
(0.0000) *
-7.620736
(0.5934)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-Statistic
Durbin-Watson stat
0.834966
0.818040
49.32888
1.300556
0.793366
0.772173
37.43488
1.155644
* indicates significance at the 5% level
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